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Summary 
 Japanese Investment in Latin America was considerable in 
the 1960s and 1970s, but the investment never took off in the 
developmental style as in East Asia.  
 The author examines why Japanese Foreign Direct 
Investment in Peru did not follow the pattern of developmental 
investment, analyzing the elements involved regarding policies in 
Peru and particular circumstances in Japan in the last decade. 
 This essay shows recent trends on bilateral relations Peru-
Japan and concludes with general considerations for public policy. 
 
 Japanese investment has been seen in developing countries as having special 
capacity for generating employment, transferring technology, and serving as an 
engine for growth and development. In part this must be due to the accelerated 
growth and development that Japan achieved following the end of World War II, 
as well as the role that it played in the industrialization of South and East Asia. 
 In Latin America, Brazil has always been the primary destination of Japanese 
investment in the region, and Mexico because of its presence in the North 
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). Most of the countries have received 
investments in mining, agriculture and oil sectors. 
 Peru’s case, however, is special. Its relation with Japan is intertwined with the 
history of the Japanese immigration, thereby creating strong emotional ties 
between the two nations. With almost 120,000 Nikkei, Peru’s population of 
Japanese descendants living in Latin America is second only to Brazil, which has 
almost a million. 
 At the beginning of Fujimori’s term a study1 concerning the image of Japan in 
Latin America in evaluating the possible range of future relations between Peru 
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and Japan indicated that 84% of the Peruvians polled thought that the relations 
should both expand and improve. Another poll, the Latinobarómetro taken in nine 
major cities throughout Latin America also reflected a positive image of the 
Japanese and Japanese enterprises, with a clear higher percentage of Peruvians 
expressing pro-Japanese sentiments.2 
 Diplomatic ties were strong during Fujimori’s tenure. At the beginning of the 
1990’s, Peru was isolated from international finance because the previous 
president Alan Garcia declared a moratorium on payments of the external debt; so 
Peru was not eligible for loans or assistance from international institutions 
including the IMF and the World Bank. Japan supported Peru at international 
level and helped to form support groups for Peru at meetings with debtor nations 
and organizations. 
 Peru also became member of APEC in 1997 with important backup from Japan. 
In addition to the numerous official exchanges, the level of financial cooperation 
reached exceptional levels, surpassing even Japan’s guidelines which limit the 
amount of money that can be assigned to a country based on predetermined GDP 
level per capita of that country. 
1. Japanese Investment in Global Context 
 Japanese FDI began to grow at an accelerated pace during the second half of 
the 1980’s. Until that period production was concentrated in Japan because the 
cheaper yen made the Japanese archipelago an excellent springboard for 
exportation to the United States, and Europe.  
 Japanese investments have been concentrated in developed countries, in 2002, 
the Japanese FDI was distributed as follows: United States was the most 
important recipient (23.5%), followed by Asia (25.3%), Western Europe (30.2%), 
and Central and South America (12.6%) (See Table 1). 
 The percentage corresponding to Central and South America includes “financial 
paradises,” such as the Cayman Islands with a total of 10.7%. Only less than 2% of 
                                                                                                                                         
 
1 See (Horisaka, 96) referring to a poll taken in 1990, just before the election in Peru 
won by Alberto Fujimori. 
2 In the Latinobarómetro, a survey annually taken in Latin American countries, 58.4% 
responded that they preferred to receive investment from Japan; 19.9% favored the 
United States; and only 6.6% indicated a preference for Europe. See Latinobarómetro, 
1995, Mori Consultants, Chile. 
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the Japanese FDI found its way to Central and South America, a percentage that 
shows the marginal nature of the region as a target for investment. 
 
Table 1 Regional Distribution of Japanese FDI 
Region 2002 
TOTAL 100.0 
North America 26.8 
 United States  23.5 
Western Europe 30.2 
Asia 25.3 
 ASEAN 4  6.8 
 Asia NIES  9.3 
 China  8.1 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
12.6 
 Caiman Islands  10.7 
Others (Africa, Middle East, 
Australia, Eastern Europe) 
5.1 
Note: Data on Balance of Payments basis. Mexico’s 
data are included in Central and South America. 
Source: JETRO based on Japan’s Ministry of 
Finance, Ministry of Finance Statistics Monthly, 
various editions. JETRO 2003. 
 
 Total accumulated investment amount in 1951-2002 shows that manufacturing 
sector was only 35.4%, and for non-manufacturing sector 64.5%, with considerable 
allotments to finances and securities, real estate, and services. Concerning the 
distribution of investments by sectors, more than half of the Japanese FDI, 55.7%, 
is directed to non-manufacturing, which includes services, finances, and raw 
materials. The manufacturing sector received 35.4%. Japan relies heavily on 
imported raw materials, but the proportion of its investment in raw materials 
seems relatively small from the total investment. Nevertheless, Japanese 
investment is not directly directed to these sectors, but the requisite materials are 
obtained through trade or from loans (as we shall see in the case of mining in 
Peru). Consequently, a large portion of the Japanese FDI in finances, securities, 
and commerce represents an indirect investment in raw materials (see Table 2). 
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Table 2  Distribution of Japan’s FDI Flows 
Sectors 2002 (%) 1950-2002 (%) 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
Manufacturing 37.6 35.4 
 Foodstuff 0.4 0.8 
 Textile 0.2 0.1 
 Rubber – Leather Products 0.0 0.5 
 Chemical 19.0 10.0 
 Oil 2.8 2.8 
 Glass – Stone Products 0.0 0.2 
 Metallic Products 0.8 1.2 
 Machinery 12.4 18.7 
 Other 2.0 1.1 
   
Nonmanufacturing 62.4 64.5 
 Construction 0.1 0.1 
 Real State 1.3 2.4 
 Commerce and Trade 11.8 13.3 
 Service 11.3 11.2 
 Transport - Logistics  0.1 0.2 
 Communications 7.9 13.0 
 Finance & Insurance 29.6 19.7 
 Other 0.3 0.8 
Note:  Official figures for 2002 and thereafter have been 
converted to yen, and have been converted to U.S. dollar by 
the exchange rate of the Bank of Japan calculated for each 
year. 
Source:  Ministry of Finance Statistics Monthly No 620. 
December 2003 
 
2. Japanese Investment in Peru 
 
 The history of Japanese investment in Peru begins towards the end of 1960’s 
when Japan was in a period of rapidly accelerating growth with increased 
exportations signaling the need to insure future sources of raw materials. In 1967, 
Japan started a policy of liberalization that was completed in 1973, the same year 
the oil crisis occurred and the flexible exchanges rates was adopted by world 
powers. Japan foresaw two major problems: the petroleum crisis reminded that 
Japan will be unstable unless assure a stable supply of raw materials.  
 The change in the monetary system, on the other hand, showed it was urgent to 
modify the industrial system from producer of low value-added, such as steel, coal 
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and textiles, to go toward the production of higher profit margin products to secure 
trade surplus.3 
 In this context, supported by different indirect mechanisms by the Japanese 
government (Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Industry) a wave of investments 
started in Latin America with the entry of Japanese manufacturing companies 
and Sogo-Shosha (Japanese trading companies)4 mainly in the mining sector. 
 
 
a. Peru: Investment in Manufacturing 
 
 In early 1970s, Japanese companies also went to Latin America to secure 
market share against protectionist agreements such as the Andean Pact (created 
in 1969 with Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, and Chile which withdraw from 
the pact in 1976, Venezuela was included in 1973). Negotiations underway would 
exclude limit foreign investment and imports of foreign goods. Peru served as an 
ideal site for this expansion, Toyota and Nissan began the production of vehicles, 
National of Peru (Matsushita) started to produce home appliances, and Ajinomoto 
produced its famous food seasoning. 
 According to the reports of Toyo Keizai 5  and information from Japanese 
companies in Lima, Japanese businesses in Peru were and are focused on the 
following areas—Toyota: assembly and import of vehicles; Química Sol: industrial 
dynamite and gunpowder; Honda of Peru: motorcycles; Ajinomoto: monosodium 
glutamate seasoning; and National Peruana: dry batteries. In addition, it appears 
that the Compañia Minera Santa Rosa, owned by Mitsui Kinzoku and Mitsui 
Bussan, has been active in developing sources of lead and zinc. The rest of the 
businesses deal with trade or services, Kawasaki del Peru: shipping; Kintetsu 
World: transport of fish cargo; Nikko Creative Service: tourism; Nissan 
Maquinarias: importation and sale of tires; and Mitsui Automotriz: importation of 
                                                  
 
3 “In 1973, industries requiring high levels of energy such as iron and steel, non-
ferrous metals, chemicals, paper pulp and paper, declined to a point of depression, 
while the production of automobiles and electronic products soared due to the 
relatively low use of energy for their production (See Kagami 1995, pp. 128-129). 
4 See Kojima and Ozawa (1984) 
5 See Toyo Keizai, 2004. 
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vehicles and components. There are no records of new Japanese companies during 
the current Toledo administration. 
 The Japanese manufacturing companies entered Peru between 1965 and 1975, 
during President Fernando Belaúnde’s term (1965-68) and Velasco Alvarado 
(1968-75) (See Table 3). It should be noted that the nascent military regime of 
Velasco did not discourage the opening of new businesses, such as Ajinomoto, 
Kawasaki de Peru, and other affiliates of Mitsui Bussan. Viewed with hindsight, 
the economic and political stability of Latin American countries was more 
important for Japanese private investment than the kind of regime.6 
 No new businesses were initiated during the succeeding governments. Only 
Honda was established during the Morales Bermúdez’s term (1975-80), but it was 
and investment agreed upon schedule. During Belaúnde’s second term (1980-95) 
and Alan Garcia (1985-90) no new businesses were opened.  
 All companies established during Alberto Fujimori’s term (1990-2001) were 
liaisons or representation offices, although there were some small investments in 
mining in partnership with other foreign or national firms, no real presence of 
Japanese investment was present. 
 
                                                  
 
6 During this same time, almost all the countries in Southeast Asia were governed by 
de facto governments, without affecting the flow of Japanese FDI. 
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Table 3 Japanese Companies Established in Peru 
Note:  (1) The data only show Japanese companies that exist today. They do not 
include for example, the Bank of Tokyo, which withdrew from Peru in 1990. 
Source: Author’s presentation based on Data Bank: Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran 
2004 [Data Bank: Compendium of Overseas Investments of Japanese Businesses, 
reported by type of business and countries]. Toyo Keizai Shuppansha. Tokyo. Toyo 
Keizai 2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
Government Term Founded Company Name Property Category 
Fernando 
Belaúnde  
1965-1968 
1965 Mitsubishi Perú S.A. Mitsubishi Shoji 
Trading 
Company 
1966 Panasonic Peruana S.A. 
Matsushita Denki 
Sangyo 
Manufacturing 
1966 
Matsushita Electric del 
Perú 
Matsushita Denki 
Sangyo 
Manufacturing 
1966 Toyota del Perú 
Toyota Jidosha / 
Mitsui Bussan 
Manufacturing 
Velasco 
Alvarado 
1968-1975 
1969 Ajinomoto del Perú Ajinomoto Manufacturing 
1969 Cía. Minera Santa Luisa 
Mitsui Kinzoku / 
Mitsui Bussan 
Mining 
1970 Química el Sol 
Asahi Kasei / Mitsui 
Bussan 
Manufacturing 
1970 Mitsui del Perú Mitsui Bussan Manufacturing 
1972 Kawasaki del Perú Kawasaki Kisen Manufacturing 
Francisco 
Morales 
1975-1980 1975 Honda del Perú S.A. Honda Giken Kogyo Manufacturing 
Fernando 
Belaúnde  
1980-1985 - - - - 
Alan Garcia 1985-1990 1985 Nikko Creative Services JAL Pack Liason 
Alberto 
Fujimori 
1990-2001 
1993 Tyre Service Peru 
Mitsui Bussan / Mitsui 
del Perú 
Liason 
1994 Mitsui Automotriz S.A. 
Mitsui Bussan / Mitsui 
del Perú 
Liason 
1995 Sumitomo Corp. del Perú Sumitomo Shoji Liason 
1995 Kintetsu World Express Kintetsu Ekusupuresu Liason 
1996 Nissan Maquinarias S.A.  
Nissan Jidosha / 
Marubeni 
Liason 
1998 Epson Peru 
Seiko Epson Latin 
America 
Liason 
1999 MC Autos del Peru Mitsubishi Shoji Liason 
1999 Cobre Tire Service Peru 
Brigestone (Mitsui 
Bussan) 
Liason 
Alejandro 
Toledo 
2001-2006 - - - - 
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b. Peru: Investment in Natural Resources 
 
 In addition to the establishment of manufacturing plants, Japanese investment 
was very dynamic in natural resources. From the almost US$2 billion 
accumulated Japanese FDI in Peru, around 80% (US$1,7  billion) went to the 
mining sector (see  Table 4). In this sector the Japanese preferred to either sign 
long term contracts or offer loans in order to establish leverage for their positions 
as purchasers, before directly buying assets. One of the reasons for this policy was 
to avoid nationalistic reactions which the Japanese had encountered various 
countries of Southeast Asia, but as De la Flor [1993] noted, copper was an 
exception to this preference because signing long term contracts did not assure 
delivery of the metal. Because of this situation, they positioned themselves for the 
purchase of the Katanga mine in 1973 by forming a consortium of Mitsui Mining 
and Smelting and Nippon Mining; through the 1975 purchase of Santa Lucia (zinc 
and tin) by the same consortium; and―also in 1975―through the formation of the 
Corporation of Copper of Michiquillay in order to invest in copper on a grand 
scale,7 unfortunately, it was an objective never realized because of the failure to 
negotiate an acceptable agreement concerning both the manipulation of foreign 
capital and the question of labor policies with the Peruvian government. 
 In addition, in the field of petroleum the Japanese government in coordination 
with private companies offered loans at low rates of interest and with very 
advantageous conditions in order to insure a stable flow of oil. Three Japanese 
global trading companies, Mitsui, Marubeni and Mitsubishi, formed JAPECO 
(Japan-Peru Oil Corporation), to work with Petroperú and Cofide (Two Peruvians 
official institutions) in order to construct the North-Peru oil pipeline. There were, 
in addition, similar financial arrangements for developing the mines of Cuajone 
and Huanzalá as well as other projects such as the copper refinery of 
Cajamarquilla, and the copper operation of Cerro Verde.  In the field of 
telecommunications, NEC directed the work for the construction of Peru’s first 
satellite. NEC then served as the source of equipment for the communication 
networks with Entel Peru as well as collaborating with the Peruvian Telephone 
Company in developing telephone centers. 
                                                  
 
7 For a detailed chronology of this first period of Japanese investment with major 
emphasis on raw materials, see De la Flor, 1993.  
  
 
9 
 What stands out about this style of investment is the fact that investments 
were made in packages where private capital was directly involved and 
coordinated with governmental agencies, such as the Japanese Eximbank and 
Japan’s Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) 8 . Since early 1980s, 
Japanese development assistance was closely tied to the local needs of Japanese 
companies, and investments were made in tandem with financing from the 
Japanese government agency, the private firm, and contractors in an integrated 
package. Today Japanese companies are more flexible and acquire products from 
non-Japanese contractors in order to avoid the complaints and demands of local 
factories in the host countries. 
                                                  
 
8 Both were merged and are now the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). 
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Table 4 Total Accumulated Japanese Investment in Peru 
 Accumulated  
Number of 
Cases 
1951-2002 
Amount 
(In millions of 
Yens) 
Industry 31 12,070 
  Food 7 4,071 
  Textiles 5 343 
  Chemical 6 237 
  Metals 2 203 
  Machinery -  -  
  Electricity 3 1,256 
  Transport Equipment 8 5958 
Agriculture 1 1 
Fishing 19 5,708 
Mining 30 173,581 
Construction 2 9,471 
Commerce 13 7,325 
Finance/Insurance 1 1 
Other 5 3,671 
Subsidiaries 5 1,989 
Property 5 479 
TOTAL 112 214,247 
 
Note: Registered Investment Flow prepared from official data from the 
Ministry of Finance of Japan. 
Source:  Ministry of Finance Statistics Monthly. 
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3. Fujimori’s Term and the Lost Opportunities 
 
 During the administration of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2001), political and 
economic cooperation was very active. Peru was a privileged recipient of technical 
assistance and loans, directly from the Japanese government and through 
international organizations. However, in comparison to the amount provided by 
ODA (Official Development Assistance), private investment was small.9 
 Peru was the first country where an ethnic Japanese became President. 
Fujimori’s parents where from Kumamoto Prefecture, and during the election 
campaign in Peru many issues emerged about Alberto Fujimori having born in 
Japan, those were proven false but the issue provides a background about the 
perception in both countries, Japan and Peru. Also in 1991 during the first visit of 
Fujimori to Japan, he was received by the Emperor as a special guest and 
considered son of Japan10.  
 The government of Japan committed to support Peru, but although provided 
considerable amounts of assistance could not convince the private sector to invest 
because of the following reasons: (i) Instability in Peru, (ii) Recession in Japan, 
which began at the beginning of 1990s, (iii) The so-called “syndrome of the lost 
decade” by which senior executives were reluctant to invest in the region; and (v) 
the lack of a targeted investment policy.  These four elements are explained later 
in this section. 
Japanese companies were badly affected by economic recession and the end of the 
“bubble economy”, and most of the senior managers of Japanese companies in 
Japan at Latin American departments were junior managers in the region in the 
1980s, when several countries including Peru decided to stop payment of the 
external debt. 
 In the manufacturing and service sectors, businesses were restructured (see 
Table 4). Mitsui Bussan and Mitsui del Perú merged to create Tyre Service del 
                                                  
 
9  For example an opinion column in 1998 in Peru’s Gestión Newspaper was titled “The 
Illusion of Japanese Investment” (Bustamante, 1998).  
10  See Jochamowitz (1993), author of a biography of Alberto Fujimori. Currently 
Fujimori is in Japan claiming double nationality, Japanese and Peruvian, and the 
current administration in Peru wants him back to Peru to face several charges after he 
fled in 2000. 
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Perú; Mitsui Bussan is joint owner with Toyota Jidosha of Toyota del Perú; in this 
same manner Nissan Jidosha and Marubeni joined to create Nissan Maquinarias 
from the same company that was closed years before. Kintetsu, a railroad 
company of the Kansai region, which also controlled more than 160 businesses 
including one of the largest supermarkets in the country, was also formed in 1995. 
 The most significant Japanese investment during Fujimori’s term was the 
Cominco/Marubeni—a consortium comprised of businesses from Japan, Canada, 
and Great Britain aimed at expanding the refinery of Zinc de Cajamarquilla. 
Marubeni also made another small investment of US$10 million in 1996 in a pulp 
paper plant of Yukari to supply their Asian market. 
 In comparison with the previous decade, the 1990s were a fairly good time to 
invest in Latin America. The so-called “Washington Consensus” advocating 
liberalization with openness to trade and privatization of public companies was 
adopted by most of the governments of Latin America. So investment from 
European countries, mainly Spain, and from the United States, and also within 
the region was considerable. Japanese companies, despite good perspectives and a 
“Nikkei” President were not interested in investment in Peru, neither in 
manufacturing plants nor privatization.  
 Japanese FDI is also low compared with the amount invested in Chile, a 
neighbor country of Peru where Japan until 1998 was fourth among major 
investors. Since 1998, the year in which Japan invested in the copper mine La 
Escondida, its investments have increased substantially with the cupriferous 
projects of La Candelaria, and with the development of Los Pelambres, an 
enormous project of US$1,3 billion. Although the privatization of public companies 
started in Chile in 1982, the Japanese were not immediately attracted and began 
to invest six years later with La Escondida mine. Distribution by industrial sectors 
shows that besides interest in copper, large Japanese investments were made in 
fishing, forest products, and agriculture, mainly natural resources that were then 
exported to the Japanese market. 
 A historical background provides light to the lower levels of investment during 
Fujimori’s term. In the 1970s, despite good financial conditions for Japanese firms, 
several projects never progressed. At that time Japan was interested in 
establishing a permanent source of copper in Latin America, a role later won by 
Chile. Also, at the beginning of the 1980s, Peru just decided not to pay Marubeni a 
debt for the construction of the North-Peruvian oil pipeline; again, five years 
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afterwards during the government of Alan García, private Japanese banks were 
affected by the imposed moratorium on the external debt. 
 To those issues must be added the unstable situation of Peru. At the end of the 
1980s terrorist attacks targeted the Bank of Tokyo and Nissan Motors (Bank of 
Tokyo immediately withdraw from Peru and Nissan closed down his plant several 
years later). Again, in 1993 three engineers from the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) were assassinated in Huaral, a city at the North of the 
capital Lima, and the event caused enormous commotion in the Japanese public. 
Lastly, when the perspective of Japanese investment seemed to improve, in 
December 1996 the residence of the Japanese ambassador in Lima was seized and 
after a five-month standoff the terrorists were overcome, but it affected several 
investment plans in the country. 
 The economic recession in Japan also provided a cause for restraining. With 
limited room for maneuver Japanese firms preferred to focus in Asia and Western 
Europe, and in Latin America in some countries such as Mexico (who as a member 
of the NAFTA agreement was a door to the US market), instead of risk capital in 
Peru. 
 Japanese FDI was also limited in the 1990s by the “syndrome of the lost 
decade”.  Senior managers in companies in Japan in the 1990s, who were junior or 
middle managers in the 1980s when debt moratorium also affecting Japanese 
private banks were imposed by several countries were afraid of further future 
instability. 
 Last but not least, one of the main obstacles to increase Japanese investment 
was the lack of a targeted promotion policy such as East Asian countries 
implemented. In early 1990s, after Fujimori came to power, Peruvian economy was 
sonly stabilized and terrorist defeated, so foreign investment (non-Japanese) 
started to increase in amounts which probably made considered unnecessary to 
seek Japanese investment.  A closer trade promotion policy with Japan, let alone 
Asia, was absent and the usual biannual meetings of the Japan-Peru private 
companies failed to produce any concrete result. 
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4. Japanese FDI in Peru in the Latin American context 
 
 Japan’s foreign investment has two principal objectives: (1) To guarantee a 
consistent source of raw materials; and (2) To protect herself against the formation 
of potential regional agreements that might exclude her, and especially so in 
vehicle and electronic industries. 
 Japanese industry began its postwar reconstruction with an increased growth 
in the exportation of manufactured goods, principally to the United States and 
then to Southeast Asia, all of which added to the accelerated development of the 
Japanese domestic market. These were all factors that created a demand for a 
much higher quantity of raw materials. In Latin America, the Japanese FDI 
started between the 1950’s and 1960’s, primarily in Brazil. The oil crisis in 1972 
coincided with the first stages of accelerated growth in Brazil, the so-called 
“Brazilian Miracle,” and Japan’s financial interests were redirected towards 
countries that had petroleum, thereby accentuating investments in Mexico and 
Venezuela. 
 Towards the end of the 1970’s, Japanese companies began to invest in the 
emerging industrialized nations of Asia, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and 
Hong Kong, where Japan began to apply a new strategy of transferring the 
manufacturing of their second generation products to these emerging industrial 
nations. Furthermore, with the support of ODA, they began to establish a 
structure of production that embraced all Southeast Asia. 
 In the 1980’s, the accumulation of enormous cash reserves and the existence of 
an industrial network gave Japanese companies the role of a major transnational 
player. In Latin America towards the latter part of the 1970’s, the concept of 
“import substitution” as well as a tendency towards strong protectionism was still 
in place, but potential problems with foreign debt began to appear on the horizon. 
At that moment it might have been possible for the Japanese to put together a 
solid infrastructure for inter-regional production in Latin America, but due to the 
situation such as recession and external debt crisis, Japanese business gave 
priority to other regions. Investment in the United States was increased, and the 
continuing focus on South and East Asia was reinforced. 
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 It is important to note that until 1988, Peru ranked third behind Brazil11 and 
Mexico as a Latin American target for Japanese FDI. The statistics from the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance show that between 1952 and 1988, Brazil received 
US$4.8 billion; Mexico received US$1.5 billion; and Peru received US$0.6 billion. 
These numbers include sums that were invested in the financial sector, including 
the purchase of properties and securities, construction and real estate. Even when 
the amount invested in the financial sector is subtracted, however, the three 
countries retain their same ranking. 
 Towards the end of 1989, the situation began to change. In addition to Brazil, 
the importance of the FDI investment in Panama and Chile began to increase. 
Brazil, of course, continued to maintain its importance because of its relation with 
MERCOSUR; Panama grew in importance as a financial bridge; and in Chile the 
FDI expanded under the impact of steadily increasing commercial activities with 
Japan. 
 
a) In Latin America     
Production plants to supply 
internal market  
Textiles, Vehicles and Basic 
electronic products 
Secure raw material 
sources 
Oil, Mining, Natural 
Gas, Forestry 
Production Bases: 
Towards NAFTA 
(Maquiladoras), 
and  MERCOSUR 
(Brazil and 
Argentina) 
 
Back to raw 
materials? 
1950-1970 1971-1980 1981-2002  Next 
     
b) In Southeast Asia     
Raw 
materials 
First 
generation 
industries 
Textiles, 
Agribusiness 
Second generation 
industries 
Home appliances, 
Vehicles, 
Semiconductors, 
Computers 
Regional 
Production 
Network 
Vehicles, 
Computers, 
Electronic goods 
4 
Consolidating 
a Global 
Production 
Network 
1950-60 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-2002  Next 
Figure 1 Evolution of Japanese Investment in Asia and Latin America12 
 
                                                  
 
11 See Hollerman (1988) for a complete description of the Brazilian case. 
12 Prepared by the author. 
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 What have been the determining factors of the Japanese FDI in Latin America? 
The strategy can be divided into four stages (see Figure 1). Between 1950 and 
1970, given the rapidly accelerating growth of the Japanese economy (average 
annual increment 16%), an assured source of raw materials was sought along with 
the creation of factories in order to obtain a portion of the overseas markets, 
especially in the fields of textiles, vehicles, and basic electronic products, taking 
advantage of the geographical axis running through Brazil, Mexico, and Peru. 
Between 1970 and 1980 attempts to insure a ready and consistent source of raw 
materials continued as a high priority. Beginning in 1980, the objective was to 
secure bases for production in a movement towards the huge consumer markets 
such as MERCOSUR, NAFTA, and various regional markets established through 
bilateral agreements. 
 In comparing the evolution of Japanese FDI in Latin America with the strategy 
employed in Asia, a number of variables stand out.  Between 1960 and 1970, 
textile factories and processing of agricultural products were created in Southeast 
Asia, and immediately in the ensuing period between 1970 and 1980 factories for 
the production of “Second Generation” goods were established, those are products 
goods which had slide on technological importance and profit margin are low. For 
example, the production of black & white TV sets became second-generation 
product when color TV appeared on the market just as the laser printers displaced 
the earlier ink jet printers.  The establishment of regional production network 
in Latin America has not been possible by several factors, including (i) the lack of 
an integrated transport and logistic infrastructure, (ii) standardization of trade 
policies in the region for tariff, and non-tariff barriers, (iii) incipient trade 
exchanges among countries, (iv) lack of cooperation and simultaneous investment 
promotion policies, and (v) lack of economies of scale due to inequality and limited 
demand. 
 These factors include those lacking in Peru, which as a medium size country 
with a strategic geographical position should be privileged for investment in the 
Western coast of South America, however has not been able to use his relatively 
closeness to Japan. The next section offers a framework to improve cooperation 
and exchanges. 
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5. Toward a New Framework for Cooperation and Investment 
 
 The election of President Fujimori in 1990 created exaggerated expectations for 
Japanese investment, which did not prospered due to Japan’s economic problems 
and lack of focused reforms and promotion in Peru.  Peru should start with the 
assessment made by Japan in recent years.  
 In the 1980s, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Saburo Okita, 
advocated the framework of Flying Geese development in Latin America13. With 
that philosophy the “Okita Foundation” was created in Argentina to be a center for 
continuous expansion of a co-prosperity sphere in Latin America. 
 Flying Geese scheme, however, requires not only a country passively receiving 
investment and assistance, but a decidedly policy of promotion of investment, 
trade toward the investment source country and domestically strong and promptly 
progress on human recourse development to support further waves of investment 
and continuous upgrading. 
 
 
Figure 2  Akamatsu’s Pattern of Development 
 
                                                  
 
13 See Okita, 1980. 
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 The original Akamatsu’s scheme is divided in stages, with times (see Figure 2), 
where in t1: certain goods are imported, in t2: domestic production starts, in t3: 
domestic production increases and exports increase. This scheme assumes foreign 
investment and domestic institutional and economic reforms. 
 In Latin America the Flying Geese have many starts but also stop because they 
are unsustainable. See lines in blue in Figure 3 where “Production” cannot 
increase because productivity increases are constrained by lack of human 
resources and small domestic or regional markets. So exports never take off, or if 
they do, arte not in a sustainable to sustain subsequent waves of investment and 
exports enough to create a flying geese of industrial pattern of development.   
 
 
 
   
Figure 3 Flying Geese Starts and Stops in Latin America (LA)14 
  
 
 Countries like Peru cannot escape from the “Start and Stop” trap because 
human resources development and foreign investment are linked and should 
increase and improve simultaneously.  
                                                  
 
14 Blue Lines for Latin America (LA) added by the author. 
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 Documents produced by Japanese scholars such as Okita’s essays and several 
report and country studies require more attention. For example, in 1998, the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency produced its Country Report on Peru. 
The study was led by Akio Hosono, senior scholar and Ambassador of Japan in El 
Salvador. The JICA report recommends development with participation and 
industrial growth. One of the appendixes includes a study by Mitsuhiro Kagami on 
cluster development, à la Michael Porter15 style, in which an isolated firm needs a 
comprehensive framework of related industries and infrastructure to develop as a 
industrial cluster. Kagami identifies nascent Peruvian clusters and recommends 
promoting them at a domestic level in Peru, and through rights promotion policies. 
Not surprising, the report repeats previous studies from public organizations in 
Japan (unpublished studies by JETRO and METI) about increase assistance on 
education and development of human resources. Hosono dedicates a whole chapter 
to propose a more participatory agreement in Peru to reduce inequality and 
promote participation which will lead to more opportunities on the labor market 
and on education. 
 Further analysis of why the Flying Geese start and stops are pending research 
topics which are extremely relevant to Peru, in a moment when foreign 
investment Chinese, this time probably from China, is starting to enter into the 
region. Though the framework that supports investment from Japan in recipient 
countries is different from China, the US, or Europe, a broader analysis is needed 
incorporating more layers such as competitiveness, historical and cultural 
backgrounds and probably cluster analysis. 
 This essay emphasizes however the obstacles that investment, in particular 
developmental, which is sustained for a long time framework developing 
industries and countries, is not sustainable in countries like Peru until more 
reforms are done. Success of those reforms will depend of a specific context, 
because it is unlikely a wave of Japanese investment is soon over there, however 
emphasis in human resources and broadening of markets to amplify economies of 
scale as well as targeting investment promotion policies are needed whether 
toward Japan or for new investment players in the region like China. 
                                                  
 
15 Harvard Business School Professor of management, author of several books and 
advocate of cluster development. 
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